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How Texans Opposed Civil Rights Legislation in the 1960s: 
Evidence from Letters to Future House Speaker Jim Wright 
Bv NEIL ALLEN 
This article examines the role of Civil Rights in the career of future House 
Speaker Jim Wright, and the views of Texans about nondiscrimination legis-
lation. Drawing on letters sent to Wright (D-TX) commenting on the legis-
lation that became the 1964 Civil Rights Act and 1968 (Open Housing) Civil 
Rights Act, this article examines how Texas citizens reacted to, and mostly 
opposed, nondiscrimination legislation. This analysis finds that economic 
and property rights arguments are the most common type of argument, and 
explicitly racist arguments are relatively rare. This article also places the op-
position of Jim Wright's constituents to Civil Rights legislation in the larger 
context of his mixed record on the issue while a back-bench representative, 
and how this record supported his later rise to leadership of Democrats in 
the House of Representatives. 
Jim Wright is best known as Speaker of the House from 1987-1989, 
and for his rapid fall from power due to an ethics scandal in 1989. But 
before he was a leader in the House, he represented the Fort Worth-
based Texas 12th district during debates over Civil Rights legislation 
in the 1950s and 1960s. Wright compiled a mixed voting record on 
Civil Rights, voting against the 1964 Act but voting for the 1957 and 
1968 Civil Rights Acts and the 1965 Voting Rights Act. Wright suc-
cessfully navigated through this tumultuous period while representing 
a district supportive of segregation, positioning himself to move into 
the House leadership in the 1970s. Using archival records, this paper 
establishes the strength of opposition to civil rights legislation in the 
Texas 12th district, and illuminates the sources of that opposition. It 
finds that Wright's constituents were overwhelmingly opposed to Civil 
Rights Legislation, and that the opposition was heavily oriented toward 
support for property rights. 
While civil rights bills were seriously debated in Congress since at 
least the 1940s, and civil rights legislation has been debated and passed 
Vol. 55 FAll 2017 Nwnber 2 
in the 1970s and 1990s, the period from 1963-68 contained the most 
serious and sustained action in the area since at least Reconstruction. 
Congress passed the momentous Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Vot-
ing Rights Act of 1965, and the less important 1968 Civil Rights Act 
focused on fair housing. Versions of the 1968 legislation were hot-
ly debated in 1966 and 1967 as well. Votes on these bills evidenced 
cross-party coalitions in support and opposition, and also the shrinking 
of the pro-civil rights coalition over time. This period provides an 
opportunity to examine how future leaders like Jim Wright navigated 
this complex issue environment. Wright's election as House Majority 
Leader in 197 6 was particularly notable, considering that he was elected 
by a caucus that had become strongly committed to the pro-integration 
position that Wright himself came to relatively late. 
The 88th-90th Congresses (1963-1969) included seven members 
that would later enter or advance in congressional leadership: Wright 
of Fort Worth, Carl Albert of Oklahoma, Hale Boggs of Louisiana, 
Gerald Ford of Michigan, John Rhodes of Arizona, Robert Dole of 
Kansas, and Robert Michel of Illinois. This article focuses on Wright, 
whose election as House Majority Leader in 1976 was the last in a con-
tinuous string of victories by candidates in contested leadership elec-
tions that were more closely identified with the Southern conservative 
wing of the party than their opponents, referred to in a recent work as 
"The Austin-Boston Connection. 
This article first discusses the career of Jim Wright in Texas and na-
tional politics, with a focus on his complex relationship to Civil Rights . 
I then discuss the arguments made by citizens who wrote to Wright 
about Civil Rights in the 1960s, drawing on archival records from his 
papers housed at Texas Christian University. I then conclude with a 
discussion of the role of Civil Rights and property rights in the shift 
of Texas from a Democratic to Republican state. 
Jim Wright as Future Congressional Leader and "Southern Liberal" 
Jim Wright was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives in 
1954, and served until his resignation in 1989. He had previously 
served as the elected Mayor of the small city of Weatherford west of 
Fort Worth, and served one term in the Texas State House from 1947 
to 1949. He was "known as the foremost liberal" in the Texas House 
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delegation in the 1950s in particular due to his willingness to oppose 
the interests of petroleum producers. He was ambitious and upwardly 
mobile throughout his career, first focusing on winning a Senate seat. 
When Lyndon Johnson became Vice President in 1961, Wright ran for 
the open Senate seat and finished third, less than two percentage points 
behind the appointed Democrat Sen. William Blakely. Wright would 
have likely beaten Republican John Tower in the runoff, as Blakely lost 
Texas liberal support due to his conservatism. Wright attempted to 
gain the nomination to run against Tower in 1966, but ended his cam-
paign after his fundraising fell below expectations. 
The Civil Rights politics of Texas in the 1950s and 1960s were a 
complex mix of continued Jim Crow segregation along with gradu-
al progress toward integration. Conservative Governor Alan Shivers 
fought against post-Brown v. Board of Education school desegregation 
with the rhetoric of interposition, echoing the "massive resistance" 
politics of his counterparts in Virginia and the Deep South, using the 
Texas Rangers to prevent court-ordered integration in Mansfield and 
Texarkana. A liberal like Ralph Yarborough, however, could win elec-
tion in 1957 at the height of the post-Brown backlash, and fight off 
a segregationist challenge from future President George H.W Bush in 
the 1964 general election. Sam Rayburn and Lyndon Johnson, occu-
pying legislative and executive leadership roles in Washington, charted 
a middle path . 
This complexity of Civil Rights politics was present in the Metrop-
lex region that sent Wright to Washington. Fort Worth had a White Cit-
izens' Council as early as 1955, and the NAACP was active in the city in 
the years after Brown v. Board of Education. North Texas State Col-
lege (now the University of North Texas) in nearby Denton had long 
denied admission to black undergraduates, but peacefully complied 
with a federal court ruling in 19 55, enrolling over 24 7 black students 
by 1958 (Marcello 1996). This pattern of gradual integration stimu-
lated by legal action and peaceful protest activity fits the larger pattern 
identified by Brian Behnken in his study of the Dallas civil rights expe-
rience. He argues that the "Dallas Way" of business-oriented consen-
sus politics provided opportunity for black protest actions to stimulate 
gradual integration: "To maintain the positive image of the city and 
promote business growth, Dallas's leaders proved willing to negotiate 
with blacks and implement desegregation measures." This movement 
toward integration occurred while Dallas County sent Bruce Alger, a 
Vol. 55 FAll 2017 Number 2 
right-wing anti-integration Republican, to Congress until 1964, and in 
1960 voters in the Dallas School District voted against school integra-
tion by a four-to-one margin. 
Operating on the left of Texas politics in the 1950s and 1960s, 
Jim Wright was vulnerable to attack as an integrationist, in particular 
because of his record as, by Texas standards, a liberal leader of the UT 
College Democrats while an undergraduate. The student group called 
for anti-lynching legislation, ending the poll tax, and integrating the uni-
versity's law school. When running for reelection to the Texas House 
of Representatives in 1948, Wright's Democratic primary opponent at-
tempted to use the ongoing NAACP litigation involving the University 
of Texas Law School against him. Eugene Miller, a former state legis-
lator, said Wright wanted "every uppity nigra with a high school diplo-
ma" to attend the University of Texas Law School. Wright responded 
by running a newspaper ad saying "I believe in the Southern tradition 
of segregation and have strongly resisted any efforts to destroy it." 
Wright attempted to stay within the mainstream of Texas Democrats, 
opposing particular facets of Jim Crow while protecting against right-
wing militant attack. 
Wright continued his rhetorical support for segregation during his 
early service in the U.S. House. When the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 
public school segregation unconstitutional in Brown v. Board of Education 
in 1954 and ruled that schools must be integrated "with all deliberate 
speed" the following year, Wright followed the lead of more senior 
Southern leaders in supporting the rejected "separate but equal" stan-
dard that had been precedent since Ples.ry v. Ferguson in 1896. Then in 
his first term, Wright said the Supreme Court "erred in judgment ... 
I feel that segregation could be ideally maintained without discrimina-
tion, that is possible for facilities to be equal while being separate." This 
rhetorical support for segregation, while maintaining his legislative fo-
cus on bringing federal resources to Fort Worth and Texas with his seat 
on the Public Works Committee, followed the example set by Speaker 
Sam Rayburn (D-Bonham) and Rayburn's former protege then-Senate 
Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson. Rayburn and Johnson maintained 
rhetorical support for segregation, strengthening their ties to Southern 
conservatives while also retaining support of the progressive liberal 
minority within their respective Democratic caucuses. 
The white backlash that swept the South, particularly the Deep 
South, in the years following Brown eroded this mildly segregationist 
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middle ground that Wright and other Texas liberal and economical-
ly-populist congressmen were attempting to occupy. The congressio-
nal manifestation of the regional backlash was the "Southern Mani-
festo," a militant segregationist statement of principles produced by 
Deep South Senators. The Manifesto's creators, led by Senator Richard 
Russell of Georgia, did not ask Rayburn or Johnson to sign, saving 
them from a choice that would have inflamed a large portion of the 
caucus they were attempting to lead. Russell and other senior Southern 
Senators also were attempting to support a future presidential run by 
Johnson, which would only be possible if he could be acceptable to 
non-Southern liberals in the party. 
Lowly back-benchers like Jim Wright, however, had to make 
a public choice to sign or refuse to sign. Following the pattern see 
in other Peripheral South state like Florida, North Carolina and 
Tennessee, the Texas House delegation split on the issue. Right-wing 
members from rural areas of the state, like Martin Dies and John 
Dowdy of East Texas and O.C. Fisher of West Texas, signed the 
Manifesto and continued to incorporate anti -integrationist arguments 
into their broader anti-communist conservatism. Wright Patman of 
Northeast Texas, whose populist criticism of large financial institutions 
as Chair of the Banking Committee made him a hero to younger Texas 
liberals like Wright, signed the Manifesto. Facing a right -wing primar y 
challenge, representing the part of the state most similar to the Deep 
South, Patman acted to protect his position of power over other areas 
of public policy. 
Wright, however, joined the majority of the Texas House delegation 
in rejecting the strident position of the Southern Manifest o. Histori -
an Tony Badger, attempting to explain why border -state Senators and 
House members rejected the Manifesto, attributes the Texas pattern to 
the influence of Rayburn. The Speaker saw the document as a poten-
tial wedge within his fractious caucus. The state's position in the 1950s 
House was as strong as any in histor y, with the Speakership and several 
committee chairmanships. This was only possible if the Democratic 
Party could stay relatively united and in the majority. Also Rayburn and 
Johnson were engaged back home in a struggle for control of the state 
party, against the conservative faction led by Governor Alan Shivers 
that wanted to withdraw support from the national Democratic Party's 
presidential ticket in 1956. This ultimately successful effort of Ray-
burn and Johnson depended on isolating the more militant anti -federal 
government conservatives within the party. 
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In justifying his more integrationist stance, Wright drew on his 
Christian (Presbyterian) faith, stating that "hatred is evil in the sigh of 
God. The Negro is a child of God, as am I and as are my kinsman. 
He possesses an immortal soul, as do we." Wright would continue this 
support for limited integration by voting for the 1957 Civil Rights Act, 
which was limited to the right to vote and had little practical effect on 
Southern society. 
Like many more moderate Southerners in Congress, Wright offered 
mixed and conflicted positions on the more consequential Civil Rights 
legislation of the 1960s. He voted against the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 
citing support for property rights. He supported the more popular 
Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the quite controversial Civil Rights Act 
of 1968, with its mostly ineffectual focus on open housing. This even-
tual move to a more integrationist position would serve him well in 
the most important election of his career, his narrow victory as House 
Majority Leader in 1976. 
Constituent Letter Data 
Like every member of Congress, Jim Wright received letters from 
constituents and other citizens commenting on issues of the day. 
Fortunately for students of Civil Rights, Congress and Texas History, 
Wright and his staff preserved incoming correspondence on Civil Rights 
legislation from 1963-1966, totally 893 individual letters. This archive 
opens a window on the opinions of everyday Texans in this period 
of contestation and transformation of racial norms and rules. It also 
illuminates the expectations that constituents had of representatives like 
Jim Wright, and the cross-pressures elected officials experience. 
Citizens who write letters to their congressman are a clearly self-se-
lected group. The decision to write to a person who they likely know 
only from popular media and sometimes a newsletter marks them as 
more interested in public affairs than their fellow citizens, and likely 
holding more definite and considered opinions. Archival data like that 
under review here is best understood as a measure of "motivated public 
opinion," providing a more narrow but deeper look into the attitudes 
of citizens on legislative issues than possible in public opinion polling. 
Letters provide a measure of district opinion, both in terms of ba-
sic support and opposition and the substantive content of actual and 
potential voters. While the letters sent to congressional offices are not 
a representative sample of district or voter opinion, they do com.mu-
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nicate to legislators and their staff the views of those they represent. 
Particularly in the 1960s, when polling was infrequent at the nation-
al level and virtually nonexistent at the district level, letters provided 
members a proxy for district opinion. Taeku Lee, in Mobilizing Public 
Opinion (2002), argues that letters to the president have significant ad-
vantages as a measure of public opinion over opinion polls, in that they 
do not contain "non-attitudes" and contain argumentative content . 
This article examines letters to Congressman Jim Wright, sent to his 
Washington office and preserved in the James Wright Papers at Texas 
Christian University in Fort Worth. The collection contains files with 
letters from 1963 and 1964 addressing the legislation that became the 
1964 bill. The archive also preserves letters from 1966 addressing that 
year's proposal, mainly concerning the inclusion on Title IV, an open 
housing provision that would have applied to sales of owner-occupied 
homes and rental of units in structures with at least four units. No let-
ters have been preserved from 1967 and 1968 concerning the modified 
and weakened open housing bill that became the 1968 Civil Rights Act. 
There is no definite way of knowing that a given folder contains 
all letters sent to a congressman like Wright on a given issue during a 
particular time. All files analyzed here contain both support and op-
position to legislation, which supports the assumption that there is not 
a corresponding "For" or "Against" file that was discarded. It is likely 
that staff discarded some portion of out -of-district and out-of-state 
letters, particularly since the practice of congressional offices was often 
to only reply to in-district letters. The data analyzed below, although 
limited by multiple kinds of selection bias, support generalizatidns 
about support for civil rights legislation, and the content of arguments 
made by constituents. 
All letters were coded for Support or Opposition to Civil Rights leg-
islation. I only included letters where support or opposition to Con-
gressional action is clear from the text. I did not include letters that ex-
pressed an opinion but did not express support or opposition, although 
these were few in number. I did not include letters asking for a copy of 
legislation, unless the request was part of a larger argument for or against 
legislation. I counted a letter as commenting on legislation if the writer 
mentioned a bill number, a proper or informal name for a specific bill, 
or referencing action by Congress. Letters that specifically called for ac-
tion on school desegregation or limitation of the power of the Supreme 
Court were not included, although tl1ese were also few in number. 
Vol. 55 FAII 2017 Number 2 
Argumentative Content: Letters to Jim Wright 
Letters from constituents not only provide data on support or op-
position to particular legislation, they reveal the type of arguments that 
underlie support or opposition. A letter that argues the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act should be opposed by their congressman because it is un-
constitutional shows a different foundation for opposition than one 
who claims their opposition comes from a belief that non-whites are 
inferior. The kinds of arguments made for and against legislation re-
veal the reasons for those positions, and also the kind of arguments 
writers think will be persuasive. 
All letters analyzed in this article were coded for their general stance 
toward Civil Rights Legislation, and five argumentative types: Property 
Rights, Constitutional, Communist/Socialist, Totalitarian, and White 
Supremacist/Racist. Many letters used more than one type, and the 
majority of letters used none. Some letters merely called for support 
or opposition to legislation, and others had argumentative content that 
did not fit into my typology. I define and discuss each type below with 
evidence from the Wright collection. 
(See Table 1) 
Nearly nine out of ten letters in the Civil Rights files of Jim Wright, 
housed at Texas Christian University, express opposition to civil rights 
legislation. Many letters merely urge Wright to vote against legislation, 
as he did in 1964, but not in 1965 and 1968. Others use creative meta-
phors to illustrate their opposition. A married couple from Fort Worth 
wrote on June 4, 1966 that the proposed open housing legislation was 
"garbage": 
My husband and I are small proper!} owners, and we think the bill is so 
rotten it stinks. When we find at!)thing around our house that stinks we 
throw it into the garbage. We expect you to do the same with that bill 
Some writers, like this constituent from Fort Worth in 1966, pre-
sented fantastical slippery-slope arguments about the push for civil 
rights legislation: 
lf Bills of this nahtre are passed, how far are we from the legislation that 
would make it a federal crime for a person to r(!ject al'!} marriage proposal 
on the ground the refusal involves the other parry} civil rights? Not too 
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long back, I would have regarded this question as ludicrous; now it appears 
to be no small thing. 
Many writers in opposition to legislation presented variations on 
the theme of a loss of core American values, often linked with argu-
ments that civil rights legislation was merely a Trojan Horse for some 
other nefarious goal. A frequent refrain was that bills were "10% civil 
rights, and 90% federal power." 
These defenses of the established order in American politics used 
several distinct, but often complimentary, types of argument. After 
reading a subsample of letters, I selected four types that seemed com-
mon or likely in letters: Property Rights, Constitutional, Communism/ 
Socialism, and White Supremacist/Racist. After coding around half of 
the Wright letters, I added an additional type for Totalitarian. 
The most common type of argument, present in 37% of letters, 
was Property Rights. A letter received this code if the writer argued 
explicitly that legislation was eliminating property rights, or the rights 
of property owners. I also included letters that argued that legisla-
tion took away the right of owners to make decisions involving their 
property. Some letters in this category also made reference to specific 
examples, like defending the ability of an owner of a house to rent a 
room to a person of their choosing. 
An illustrative example, from a Fort Worth resident on June 9, 
1963, makes reference to Wright's relative liberalism and connects it to 
property rights and other values: 
I disagree most emphatical/y with your work in the U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives far you have continual/y spoken far the trend toward Socialism 
in this country. I am against the Administration} proposed Civil Rights 
Bill. It is an unconstitutional ttempt to deprive American (sic) of their 
proper!} nghts. . . . You have made me a Republican. 
This letter, like many others, joins a property rights argument to 
other argumentative types discussed below. This letter is typical of 
those supporting Property Rights, in that those rights are presented as 
universal, not specifically as enjoyed by white Americans. A letter from 
the National Restaurant Association on Nov. 1, 1963, presented a more 
concrete argument against the public accommodations section of the 
bill that became the 1964 Civil Rights Act: 
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By suf?jecting private business to unnecessary harassment and f?y enabling 
the Federal Government o exert more control over individual rights and 
over private business, the proposals, if enacted, can on/y result in the dim-
inution of free enterprise and of the rights and freedoms of all citizens. 
Property Rights is presented here as a universal concept at the core 
of American politics and society. Some writers also presented a prag-
matic case for property rights, focusing on the experience of the prop-
erty owner under proposed legislation: 
A property owner, acting in good faith, might be accused of de1!Jing the 
right of a member of a minority group or a'!)'bocfy else, for that matter, 
to b1!J his property. The accuser has the right to sue the owner of such 
property. Whether the accuser is acting in good faith or out of sheer malice 
the end result will be the same. The property owner mqy face months or 
years of costfy litigation trying to establish his innocence. He will not be 
able to dispose of his own property while settlement of the case is pending. 
To ma'!)' in our mobile American society where jobs often demand frequent 
transfers, this could mean disaster. 
Wright, who would later vote for the 1968 Civil Rights Act that 
included restrictions on the choices of residential property owners, 
echoed this opposition to legislation on Property Rights grounds in 
his ''Wright Slant" newsletter to constituents on June 23, 1963. This 
support for a Property Rights critique of then-president Kennedy's 
civil rights proposals garnered support from letter writers, with one 
correspondent from Houston writing on June 28, 1963 that Wright's 
statement was the "highest expression of Americanism." Responding 
to a constituent letter also in June of 1963, Wright drew a clear distinc-
tion between public institutions that are legitimately subject to federal 
government regulation, and private institutions that are exempt: 
There is in my mind a clear legal difference between public/y owned, tax 
financed facilities on the one hand, and private business establishments, 
privatefy owned and individual/y supported on a voluntary basis f?y indi-
vidual customers on the other. 
I believe in the government's duty to protect the constitutional 
rights of every citizen. But one of these rights is the right of private 
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property. I do not want to see the government violate this right, any 
more than I would want it to violate any other constitutional right of 
our citizens. 
This focus on private property that Wright shared with his constit-
uents helps to explain how Wright supported bills focusing on voting 
rights in 1957 and 1965, but opposed the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 
Wright continued this Private Property focus in the first phases of 
the open housing debates on the 89th and 90th Congresses. Respond-
ing to a Ft. Worth letter of June 26, 1966, opposing how "our govern-
ment has systematically eroding the rights of one group of citizens to 
improve those of other citizens," Wright wrote on July 1, 1966: 
Thank yo11 for yo11r comm11nication. I think yo11 are correct in yo11r op-
position to Title IV ef the proposed Civil Rights Bill ef 1966. In my 
;itdgment, this provision sho11ld not and will not be enacted. I have, in fact, 
so advised the President. 
Certainfy I co11ld not vote to remove from the American people a tight ef 
choice so basic and so personal as the selection ef those to whom we might 
wish to sell or rent 011r homes. 
This does not mean that I favor discrimination against any race. 
You and I probably feel about the same way. It will be recalled that I 
actively supported the Voting Rights bill last year, assuring to all Amer-
icans these equal and fundamental rights of citizenship. But just as I 
opposed certain provisions of the Civil Rights Bill of 1964 as an un-
warranted invasion of the rights of private property, so I do oppose 
this new proposal. 
Wright also voted with 20 of 22 Texas congressmen to remove 
Title IV (a strong open housing provision) from the 1966 Civil Rights 
Act. While Wright's papers do not include letters from 1967-68, it is 
unlikely that they would reflect any change in their opposition ground-
ed in Property Rights. Letters to Earl Cabell, representing a similar 
next-door district, reflected the same trend of opposition from 1966 
through 1968. 
Constitutional argument was the second most common type, at 
17% of letters. I counted letters in this group if the writer argued 
particular legislation was unconstitutional, or that constitutional rights 
were at stake in this issue. While writers occasionally mentioned specif-
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ic constitutional provisions like the Republican Form of Government 
clause or Free Speech, Constitutional arguments usually were of the 
general variety shown here by a Houston resident on Oct. 14, 1963: 
The Civil Rights Bill qf 1963 is a further extension of federal executive 
power created at the expense of individ11als of all races. It is nothing b11t 
a law for a controlled !)'Stem of life which is in direct opposition to 011r 
Constit11tion. . . Stand 1tp for Constit11tional government which g11ar-
antee S !ates and h11man tights as God granted us theses rights i?J doing 
everything in yo11r power to defeat the so called Civil Rights Bill of 1963. 
Related to both Property Rights and Constitutional arguments is 
the next most common type, Communism/Socialism at 8%. I classi-
fied letters as in this group if they criticized legislation as Communist 
or Socialist (which were used interchangeably and negatively in con-
text). Writers would have to explicitly mention either ideology, like a 
Fort Worth resident on June 20, 1966: 
High among the of?jectives of Comm11nism is the abolition of the concept 
of private proper(Y. To deprive a person i?J law of the right to absol11te 
ownership of proper(} and the abili(Y to choose within certain bo11nds what 
he mqy do with it, is to make a mockery of the right to life, liber(Y and 
the p11rs11it of happiness as ascribed i?J 011r forefathers who fo11nded this 
Nation of 011rs. 
Interference with private property or economic choice of any type 
is often classified as communist or socialist, usually with no reference 
to the rights of minorities that might have countervailing claims. 
The following lengthy quote from a Smithfield, Texas resident on 
July 2, 1963 shows how anti-communism, support for private property 
and a constitutional theory based on economic rights were reinforcing 
concepts. This letter to Jim Wright also explicitly casts these concepts 
as unconnected to racial rights, but founded on universalistic concepts: 
We are not against colored people having more freedom; however, we Ab-
hor and Detest a'!)! rnling that destrqys free enterprise. We are Jpeaking 
of the proposal that a'!Y caje owner or owners of vario11s other b11siness 
establishments m11st cater to negroes whether thry wish it or not. 
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This is merely another step our government is taking toward be-
coming a Socialistic State. Businesses should always have, as in the 
past, the right to refuse service to anyone. When the government of 
the United States has the power to tell an individual how he must run 
his business and to whom he must cater, we no longer have a govern-
ment by the people and for the people. Instead, we have something 
very similar to what we fought against in World War 2. 
This letter also shows another argumentative type, Totalitarianism. 
Letters are classified as using a Totalitarian type of argument if 
the writer claimed that civil rights legislation (usually the 1964 variant) 
constituted a government on the same form as the Nazi Germany or 
Soviet Russia. The following passage from June 1 7, 1963 shows this 
classification of civil rights legislation as creating a totalitarian govern-
ment. 
We, as citizens ef the United States, and you, in particular, should be 
quite concerned with the powers that the President is trying to assume. We 
speak ef &mia having a dictator and ef Germa'!Y having had its Hitler, 
111hen we sit and watch a man that can certain!J be classified as more ef a 
dictatorial individual than either the case ef Russia or Germaf!Y. 
This letter also claims that President Kennedy is attempting to be-
come a dictator, a claim also sometimes applied to his brother Robert 
as Attorney General. Merely making this argument about increasing 
presidential power was not classified as Totalitarian. 
An interesting finding of this study is the relative absence of ex-
plicitly racist or white-supremacist arguments. Only 3% of letters used 
a White Supremacist or Racist argument. I defined this category as 
including writers that argued non-whites were inferior to whites, that 
ascribed negative characteristics to non-whites, or that explicitly sup-
ported segregation. Some writers like a Fort Worth resident writing on 
June 6, 1966, made explicitly race-conscious arguments in conjunction 
with other argument types: 
I do not want to live in the same rooms with Negroes, Mexicans or whatev-
er else wishes to move in with me. I have a bed room and need some one for 
companionship but I sure don't want a Negro or a Mexican. This makes 
us as bad as the Communist or Gestapo. 
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Such arguments, however, only appear in 26 of 893 letters from Jim 
Wright's Texas constituents. 
This relative lack of explicitly racial or racist appeals should not 
be seen as evidence of the absence of racism or white supremacy by 
letter writers. It however does reveal the assumptions of citizens about 
which arguments will likely be persuasive of their representatives, and 
also how underlying racist attitudes were held in conjunction with 
race-neutral arguments. Letter-writers were over twelve times more 
likely to ground their argument in economics than to reference racial 
characteristics. 
Conclusion: The Shifting Politics of Race and Property Rights 
Review of letters sent by Texans to future House Speaker Jim 
Wright yield two significant conclusions about race in American and 
Texas politics. First, a skilled, or possibly lucky, politician like Jim 
Wright could still navigate the politics of race and federal public policy 
from a Texas foundation, and ascend to the national leadership of the 
leftward-shifting Democratic Party. Second, Wright's incoming corre-
spondence on race in the 1960s reveals the primacy of private property 
rights in Texas and American political culture. 
Jim Wright, like most Democratic Texas congressmen of the time, 
was able to avoid serious electoral challenge. The closest he ever came 
to defeat was in 1980, when he defeated a well-funded Republican chal-
lenge from Fort Worth Mayor Pro Tern Jim Bradshaw 60%-40 % while 
Ronald Reagan was carrying the district 52%-46% over Jimmy Carter 
What is more significant is his rise to leadership in 1976, during period 
when liberals and reformers were advancing within the Democratic 
Party. When he ran for the open Majority Leader position in 1976, 
he was a throwback to a different Democratic Party. As a high-rank -
ing member of the pork-barreling Public Works Committee, he was 
a defender of advancement by seniority, which had been drastically 
weakened by reforms after the 197 4 election. Wright had a mixed re-
cord on Civil Rights, and sought leadership of a party where Southern 
segregationists were a rapidly-shrinking minority. 
Wright's voting record in the 1950s and 1960s was only partly what 
his constituents, or at least those constituents motivated to write letters, 
wanted from their man in Washington. His support in 1968 of a fed-
erally-enforced, though weak, right to buy or rent housing irrespective 
of race cut against the nearly 9 in 10 of respond ents who opposed 
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federal intervention on behalf of racial minorities. But that vote on 
the 1968 Civil Rights Act moved him closer to his non-Southern col-
leagues. The growing backlash against federal social and economic 
action was rapidly eroding the Great Society coalition, with support 
for Civil Rights legislation on final passage dropping from 69% in 1964 
to 59% in 1968 on final passage. Wright, along with future Majority 
Leader Hale Boggs of Louisiana, were two of only five of 294 mem-
bers who voted on both bills, but shifted from opposition to support. 
This was a case of "pre-leaderships signaling," showing liberal mem-
bers of the caucus that Wright and Boggs were joining the pro-civil 
rights mainstream of the party. 
Wright understood his vote against the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
and his roots in the segregationist one-party Texas of the 1950s and 
1960s, were a liability in his 197 6 race. Combined with his support for 
the Vietnam War and relative conservatism on domestic issues, Wright's 
voting record placed him behind two other ambitious Democrats as 
the party met to select new leadership. The other two major candidates 
had unimpeachable Civil Rights credentials. The frontrunner was Phil 
Burton (D-CA), from San Francisco, had voted for all Civil Rights bills 
from 1964 forward and was a leader of the reformist group of Dem-
ocrats that had swelled with the 1974 Watergate landslide. Richard 
Bolling (D-MO) of Kansas City had an even longer record of pro-Civil 
Rights activity as the primary supporter of integration legislation on 
the powerful Rules Committee. Wright's notes for his speech to the 
closed-door Democratic Caucus meeting prior to the Majority Leader 
election outline his argument on Civil Rights. He emphasizes his votes 
for the 1957 Civil Rights Act, and every piece of integration legislation 
from the 1965 Voting Rights Act forward. He explicitly references his 
evolution on the issue as a Southern liberal. 
Wright specifically addressed his prior mixed record on civil rights 
in a letter to Democratic Houses colleagues Nov. 17, 1976, just prior to 
the Majority Leader vote. He writes that "I could not pretend to have 
a 'perfect' record on civil rights," claiming he voted against some bills 
"for reasons which I thought at the time to be valid but which I no lon-
ger believe to be correct." Wright cites his refusal to sign the Southern 
Manifesto, vote for the 1957 Civil Rights Act, and support for all post-
1964 integration legislation, stating: 
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I am pleased i?J the fact that I have probab/y have as good and long-stand-
ing a record of support far basic civil and human rights as mryone from 
my part of the country could be expected to have and survive in the polit-
ical turbulent years that are behind us. My record in this regard is quite 
different from that of most of my colleagues from the geographic area I 
represent. 
The Texan attempts to diminish the sterling pro-integration records 
of his rivals Bolling and Burton, writing "it takes a hell of a lot more 
courage and conviction for a person from my area to take these public 
positions than it does for someone from Kansas City or California." 
The evidence presented here from Wright's incoming constituent 
correspondence clearly support his retrospective evaluation of the po-
litical context facing a relatively-liberal Southerner deciding whether to 
support or oppose the 1964 Civil Rights Act. While most House mem-
bers from the region did vote against the landmark legislation, Wright 
probably overstated the narrowness of his options. Fellow Texas liberal 
House member Jack Brooks, then representing a district that included 
Beaumont and much of rural East Texas, voted for all civil rights bills 
including the 1964 legislation and was consistently reelected. Charles 
Weltner, representing an Atlanta-centered Georgia district, voted for 
the 1964 Act and was narrowly reelected. But Wright's larger point 
about his electoral vulnerability on the issue was correct. 
Wright's Civil Rights evolution was just enough to support his nar-
row election. Bolling and Burton had both alienated potential support-
ers with ideological inflexibility and an unwillingness to cultivate per-
sonal relationships. Wright's base of Southerners, conservatives and 
committee chairman enabled him to eliminate Bolling by two votes 
in the penultimate vote, and to best Burton by a single vote for the 
Majority Leadership. This narrow victory enabled Wright to succeed 
Tip O'Neil as Speaker of the House in 1986, and to function as one of 
the most effective modern legislative leaders until his rapid fall in 1989. 
Wright was the last leader of the Democratic Party in Congress 
to emerge from the coalition of urban machine liberals and Southern 
conservatives that dominated the party in the House and often the 
Senate in the middle part of the twentieth century. When forced to 
resign over allegations of financial improprieties involving publishing 
contracts and campaign finance in 1989, Wright was replaced by Tom 
Foley of Washington State, a liberal in the reformist tradition. Not 
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since Wright have the House Democrats had a leader who was from 
the South, or from the moderate portion of the party. 
The opposition to Civil Rights legislation, and to federal govern-
ment action in general, that emerges from Wright's incoming corre-
spondence reveals one source of this leftward shift in the Democratic 
Party. The movement of whites to the Republican Party that began on 
the presidential level in the 1960s would by the 1990s leave the Dem-
ocrats as a clear minority in Southern congressional elections. Candi-
dates from states like Texas could no longer count on the support of 
the dozens of moderate and Southern populist members necessary to 
advance in House leadership. This shift was evident in the ascension 
of Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) to the leadership of House Democrats in 
2003. A protege of Jim Wright's 1970s antagonist Phil Burton, and 
representing Burton's old San Francisco congressional seat, Pelosi is 
firmly anchored on the left end of a left-trending party. When Mi-
nority Leader Richard Gephardt (D-MO) left the leadership to run for 
president in 2004, Martin Frost (D-TX) began preparing to challenge 
Pelosi, then the second-ranking House Democrat. Frost, a former Jim 
Wright loyalist who represented much of Wright's old Fort Worth base, 
would have created a rerun of the 1976 Majority Leader race with a 
challenge to Pelosi from the moderate wing of the party. But after 
canvassing potential supporters, Frost decided that his chances were 
so slim he would not even attempt to challenge the California liberal 
Pelosi. 
The opposition to Civil Rights, which Jim Wright sometimes joined 
and later repudiated, is often conceptualized as fundamentally about 
racism and white supremacy. But the prominence of property-rights 
arguments in Wright's incoming Civil Rights correspondence reveals 
a different facet of the anti -integration narrative. This data demon-
strates the fundamental importance of individual economic rights in 
the American political tradition. Support for a free-market society in 
which individuals are unencumbered by government regulation was 
a powerful component of the defense of segregation . This prop-
erty-rights narrative, while idealized and ignoring the valid econom-
ic rights claims of minorities, allowed supporters of segregation to 
connect their economic and personal interest with broader egalitarian 
themes in American politics. 
Seen from the perspective of the property and economic-rights 
grounded opposition to integration of Wright's constituents, the legis-
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lative output of the federal government in the 1960s is even more re-
markable. When President Lyndon Johnson of Texas pushed through 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, he was staking his political future and that 
of his party on a vision of federal government action that ran counter 
to the understanding of American individuals rights held by Texans. 
Even in a then-strongly Democratic Fort Worth represented by the rel-
atively-liberal Jim Wright, integrating public accommodations and em-
ployment was understood as a denial of fundamental individual rights. 
The narrative of economic individualism, while supportive of 
white privilege, could be expressed by individual citizens in a facially 
non-racist manner. When the brief pro-federal action consensus of 
1964-65 evaporated in the conflict of the late 1960s, the Democratic 
Texas of Lyndon Johnson and Jim Wright gave way eventually to a 
Republican Texas of strong devotion to individual economic liberty 
and opposition to federal government action. The direct achievements 
of Civil Rights legislation remain, as legal segregation is no more and 
minorities participate in the political process. But the argument of Jim 
Wright's constituents, that the federal government has no place limit-
ing or influencing the economic choices of individuals and businesses, 
continue to drive American and Texas politics. 
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Notes 
1 John McCormack unopposed for Speaker in 1961, Albert defeating Richard 
Bolling in 1961 for Majority Leader, McCormack's victory over Morris 
Udall in 1968, Albert's lopsided victory over John Conyers in 1970 for 
Speaker, Boggs defeating Udall and James O'Hara in 1971, Wright over 
Bolling and Phil Burton in 1976. Anthony Champagne, Douglas B. Hiir-
ris, James W. Riddlesperger Jr., and Garrison Nelson, The Austin-Boston 
Connection: Five Decades of House Democratic Leadership, 1937-1989, 
(College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 2008). 
2 The NAACP litigation, which Wright was unconnected to, eventually 
led to the U.S. Supreme Court decision Sweatt v. Painter in 1950, ruling 
that the University of Texas Law School must admit blacks. 
3 The Eisenhower administration's stronger bill, which was similar to the 
later 1964 Act, could not overcome a Senate filibuster in 1956. The 1957 
bill was able to avoid the same fate by subjecting claims of denial of voting 
rights to jury trial, insuring continued white control of civil rights policy 
in the South. 
4 Phone calls to offices also serve as a kind of proxy for public opinion, but 
have not been preserved in archives. 
5 Works using by George Lovell (on Civil Rights) and Alan Brinkley (on 
populist critics of President Franklin Roosevelt) use archival letters to es-
tablish mass political attitudes during the New Deal period. See George I. 
Lovell, This is Not Civil Rights: Discovering Rights Talk in 1939 America 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012); Alan Brinkley, Voices of 
Protest: Huey Long, Father Coughlin, and the Great Depression. 
6 Wright also replied to letters from clearly out-of-district locations (for 
example Houston or Dallas). This might be related to the fact that he was 
preparing for another statewide Senate campaign in 1966. 
7 I here assume that a writer in 1964 who, in a general manner, calls for 
Congress to support or oppose school integration is not specifically com-
menting on the portions of the 1964 bill that gave the federal government 
the ability to bring suit on behalf of children in segregated public schools. 
Infrequently writers would comment directly on that part of the bill, and 
those letters were included. Wright likely received letters in the 1950s 
and 1960s about school integration judicial rulings like Brown v. Board of 
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Education, but these were not preserved in his papers. 
8 Jim Wright Papers (JW), Texas Christian University Special Collections, 
Civil Rights File. 
9JW 
10 These letter writers do not address the possibility that guaranteeing civil 
rights might require federal action, including enhanced authority. 
11 JW, Civil Rights File. 
12 ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 The attempt to strip Title IV failed 190-222, but the bill died in the Senate. 
18 A sample of letters to Cabell 1966-68, drawn from his papers at Southern 
Methodist University, were 82% opposed to Civil Rights Legislation. 
19 JW, Civil Rights File. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid . 
22 Ibid. 
23 JW, Undated notes, Civil Rights File. 
24 Richard Bolling Papers, letter from Jim \Vright to Robert Dawson, Univer-
sity of Missouri-Kansas City Library Special Collections,Jim Wright folder. 
25 See Champagne et. al, 230-250 . 
26 Houston Chronicle Nov. 9, 2002. 
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Table 1: Argument Type, Jim Wright Letters 
Argument Type # % 
For Civil Rights 97 11% 
Against Civil 796 89% 
Rights 
Property Rights 334 37% 
Constitutional 153 17% 
Communist/ 71 8% 
Socialist 
Totalitarian 53 6% 
White Supremacist 26 3% 
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